China's Spies in the U.S. Navy
Insights from Dr. Li-Meng Yan
Earlier this month, two Chinese-born U.S. Navy service members, Jinchao Wei and Wenheng Zhao, were arrested and charged in federal courts, on separate indictments, for transmitting sensitive military information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The U.S. Department of Justice’s press release can be read here.
In the 17 August 2023 episode of her podcast, “The Voice of Dr. Yan,” Chinese virologist and whistleblower Dr. Li-Meng Yan shares her insights into these two cases.
TOP TAKEAWAYS:
According to Dr. Yan, these two cases are both very serious and should not be taken lightly, despite some commentators in the U.S. media downplaying the significance. We don’t know how far the CCP has infiltrated into the U.S. military forces, or how much sensitive information they have.
Even a low ranking sailor may have access to sensitive and classified information. JINCHAO WEI, 22, machinist’s mate and naturalized U.S. citizen, allegedly provided detailed photos, videos and technical manuals of the U.S.S. Essex, a Wasp-class multi-purpose amphibious assault ship stationed at U.S. Naval Base San Diego. Dr. Yan points out how the detailed information provided would be very helpful to an enemy to identify vulnerabilities.
Although Dr. Yan believes it would be very difficult for the PRC to replicate U.S. military technology, China and Russia working together could possibly use the information to update their own systems.
In Dr. Yan’s opinion, the low bounty ($5,000) paid to Wei suggests the CCP intelligence agent was cultivating a relationship with Wei and likely intended to develop a long-term collaboration with him, which would involve pushing him harder and harder to obtain more and more sensitive information.
Dr. Yan describes a foreign news report that reveals Wei told his mother about his spy work and she encouraged him to continue. Dr. Yan discusses possible reasons why Wei would share this information with his mother and reasons why she might support his work. Dr. Yan shares knowledge of the working styles and tactics of the Chinese intelligence community and the United Front network within the U.S., including the use of family connections to advance intelligence work.
The second case is that of Petty Officer WENHENG ZHAO, 26, who allegedly disclosed sensitive military photos and operational plans for a U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region to a Chinese intelligence officer who worked under the identity of a maritime economic researcher. Dr. Yan discusses the ease of obtaining such identity documents and credentials.
Zhao also allegedly photographed electrical diagrams and blueprints for a radar system stationed on a U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan. Dr. Yan discusses the importance of Okinawa for U.S. military strategy.
Dr. Yan describes how the Chinese Communist Party uses propaganda to blame anti-Chinese and anti-Asian “racism” as a smokescreen to hide their bad acts.
TRANSCRIPT
“Chinese Spies Caught in US Navy: A Deep Dive” — 17 August 2023
Dr. Li-Meng Yan
(0:28)
In this episode I’m going to talk about what happened last week — that is, two U.S. Navy sailors who are Chinese-born American, they are naturalized now, they were arrested on charges tied to national security in China. Which means they were identified as Chinese government spies in the Navy, and also there are a lot of reports about them.
(0:55)
First I’m going to introduce this case to you, because this is a very serious national security issue. And also, based on this case, I will let you know what happened in China based on this case, and how the Chinese government responded to this spy case. And also, why this kind of case would happen. Is it very serious, very harmful — or, according to some other commentators who try to downplay the importance of the case — like oh, they’re low level staff on the ship, so they won’t create too much threat to the Navy. So, let’s see how would you think about it after we talk about this case?
(1:45)
First, I see how the news reported. So the two U.S. Navy sailors were arrested for alleged conspiring to pass sensitive security information to Chinese officials in separate plots. This was announced Thursday (3 August 2023). So these two people, they worked independently. So this is two cases actually, happened at different time but both in Navy. And they just reported it together at this moment.
(2:19)
The first case, that is Chinese American, his name is Wei Jinchao. Wei is his family name. Wei is a 22-year-old sailor aboard the San Diego based U.S.S. Essex. Was busted [and brought up on] charges after he provided China with detailed information of the ship and its crew. [According to] New York Post, federal prosecutors alleged Wei made contact with a Chinese government intelligence officer in February 2022, which was one and a half year ago, and provided photographs and videos of the Essex amphibious assault ship that specialized in transporting and deploying helicopters.
(3:14)
So the information Wei disclosed included technical and mechanical manuals as well as details about the number and treatment of marines during the upcoming exercise. And the CCP officials also […] told Wei not to discuss their relationship and take measures to cover his tracks and destroy any evidence that they knew each other. So clearly, the Chinese officials is training Wei how to be a professional [spy].
(3:50)
And also, Wei was charged under a rarely-used espionage […] that make it a crime to gather or deliver information to aid a foreign government.
So let’s stop here. Because the next case is a separate case. First, let’s see what is U.S.S. Essex? […] Here is a web page for the U.S.S. Essex. It listed the mission and also some basic parameters of this ship. U.S.S. Essex is the second ship to be commissioned in the Wasp-class of multi-purpose amphibious assault ships.
(4:44)
The principal mission of Essex is to conduct prompt, sustained approaches at sea, primarily as a centerpiece and flagship of the amphibious ready group. LHD [landing helicopter dock] provides a means to transport, deploy, command and support all elements of a marine-landing force of over 2,000 troops during an assault by air and amphibious craft.
(5:19)
Designed to be versatile, Essex has the option of simultaneously using helicopters, Harrier jets and landing craft air cushion as well as conventional landing craft and assault vehicles in various combinations.
In this type of ship, missions were operating with aircraft carrier battle group. The ship’s extensive medical facility consists of six medical operating rooms, four dental operating rooms, medical laboratories and hospital facilities capable of caring for 600 patients. In carrying out its primary mission, this 844-foot long, 44,000 ton Essex will transport and land ashore troops, tanks, trucks, artillery and other supplies necessary to support an assault.
(6:15)
This ship was launched in February 1991 and commissioned in October 1992, while moored at Naval Air Station North Island. This is the fifth ship named Essex. It served as a common ship for Expeditionary Strike Force 7 until replaced by another U.S.S. ship in April 2012.
So based on the background of this ship, we already can get an initial idea that this is definitely not a simple case. Although I wonder what exactly what we […] for CCP and this ship. So I checked the DOJ report on this case. [The] indictment, unsealed [2 August 2023], “alleges that Wei was an active duty sailor on the U.S.S. Essex stationed at Naval Base San Diego. In his role as a machinist mate. Wei held a U.S. security clearance” —
He had a clearance, and that is very important. So it means, also, his title could be a low-ranking position on the ship, but he has certain access to classified information.
(7:39)
— “and had access to sensitive national defense information about the ship’s weapons, propulsion, and desalination systems. Ships like Essex resemble small aircraft carriers and allow the U.S. military to project power and maintain presence by serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious readiness and expeditionary strike capabilities.
According to the indictment, Wei began communicating with the CCP’s IC [intelligence community] officers one and one half year ago [in February 2022]. That officer asked Wei to provide this information. These two people also realized that [the] U.S. government would definitely pay attention to this kind of case, so they decided to delete records of the conversation and use an encrypted method to communicate.
(8:45)
So as the IC officer has requested, in March 2022 and then to [the] present, Wei has sent photos and videos of the Essex, and disclosed the location of various Navy ships and described defensive weapons of the Essex. In exchange for this information IC officers paid him thousands of dollars over the course of the conspiracy.
In this case we can see this is a long-term relationship. Definitely this is not a small potato that CCP will just use one time and then let go. Also he is just a young machinist’s mate on the ship. But he just start his career, right? If he can keep working in this area, of course, in the future he is very potentially useful for CCP to obtain more sensitive information from other ships and other departments of the Navy. Right?
(9:59)
So that’s why this case, at the beginning, CCP’s IC officers already had this kind kind of trained to know how to contact each other in encrypted way and erase the kind of traces.
Also this IC officer clearly told Wei what kind of information would be useful. Sometimes here I just want to let our audience know more about CCP’s IC and also works actually for USSR based on my research on their spy histories.
Usually we would have this kind of idea, oh, yeah, these kind of low-ranking soldiers or officers, they don’t have too much possibility to get access to the high[ly] firewalled
confidential information. So why would a foreign government spend a lot of time, and take the risks, and pay the money to exchange the deleted information?
However, from the perspective of the foreign government — especially China or the USSR — because they have huge gaps between American military for the very advanced technology. What they need is every little piece of information which can help them to complete the puzzle.
(11:28)
And even if just, for example, what kind of software you are using in this office? Ok, then, we can manage to obtain such software, and then we can do the same things as you can. And al[so], I can try to understand the software and hack it, right?
And what kind of weapons, for example in this case you would installed on the Essex ship. Maybe you helped install ten tanks. And also you put another 20 helicopters. And how could you pack them in the Essex ship? When you try to use them, what is the procedure you will make these tanks or helicopters first maybe go to the [main deck], or directly through the side gate of the ship?
All this kind of information would be very helpful to your country’s enemies.
(12:29)
And back to the Essex. It has extensive medical facilities which can take care of 600 patients. This is a huge capacity during wartime. So if the enemy gets this kind of information, they know how the electricity supply for the medical facility, where is the place you store the drugs, and also where is your operating room, where is your ICU, where is your emergency treatment room.
Altogether, this will give a clear map to your enemies to let them make a plan how to attack you. How to destroy your medical capacities in a very quick and efficient way during the war time.
So I just take some very simple examples to explain what may happen during the war if the CCP get your information and design countermeasure protocols.
(13:40)
Also, let’s imagine — if this guy Wei has the skills and the access to certain important equipments and he can install timing bombs or hacking procedures, that will help the Chinese Communist Party to remotely manipulate and destroy the very critical parts of this ship. Even [if it] didn’t happen, it would [have] happened in the future if this spy was not arrested. Right?
The indictment further […] that in June 2022 Wei sent the CCP officer approximately 30 technical and mechanical manuals. These manuals contain export control warnings and detailed the operations of multiple systems aboard the Essex and similar ships, including power, steering, aircraft and deck elevators, as well as damage and casualty controls. The CCP officer confirmed with Wei that at least 10 of those manuals were useful to him. For passage of those materials, the indictment alleges that Wei was paid $5,000.
(15:05)
In this part of the report, it describes that at least 30 manuals on the Essex were passed to CCP and this includes damage and casualty control information. Also power and other systems. So this would provide CCP a very good opportunity to study how to damage this ship from different angles. Like maybe one missile will target the power system. Another missile will go directly to shut down the elevators and where is the damage control is destroyed first.
This kind of tactics will paralyze the whole ship, and that would be a very good achievement, if CCP can do it, in wartime.
(16:02)
And it is difficult for CCP to mimic the technology you use in the Essex ships. So, clearly, in a short period, you won’t see CCP reproduce this kind of system and install it on their ships. That is too difficult.
But what they can do is to learn from these manuals, learn from the systems, and update their current systems. So, previously they may have had, like, 50 percent difference from American Navy on these kinds of ships. And after the improvement — and don’t forget they’re paired with Russia now, and according to the news we have already reported, CCP has extended their collaboration in intelligence system. So that means there is more change for CCP and Russia to work together to improve their weapon capacity using this information.
And also, as we see, this officer, he just paid $5,000 to Wei, and he said at least 10 of the manuals, of the 30, were useful to him. So it doesn’t mean the other 20 manuals are not useful at all. This is a CCP officer, right? This officer, will he tell all the truth to Wei? No! Clearly he is just using Wei. Wei is just one of the spies he developed. If they pay Wei quite a lot of money and highly praise his achievement, then the next time Wei may expect a higher price. And also it would make Wei think that, oh, it’s so simple to collect information for you. And he may not work hard next time, just grab something next to him and give it back to CCP. That’s not what CCP want.
(18:16)
They want to push Wei to have a long term collaboration and keep him working harder and harder to get more and more sensitive information. So initially they won’t pay him quite well.
And also according to the report, this is […] equal to around ten percent of Wei’s annual salary. So for Wei, the first time […] he gets this kind of payment, it is already a kind of reasonable payment to Wei, and it can encourage him to work harder for CCP in the future.
And by the way, when the CCP officer gave Wei $5,000, it doesn’t mean CCP spent only $5,000 for this information. To establish such spy network, CCP is very generous. It can spend millions of dollars. And Wei is just one dot of the network of navy, or maybe just in that naval bases, we don’t know, we still don’t know how much CCP has infiltrated into naval bases.
(19:33)
So again, in the same months, through last year, the CCP officer requested Wei provide information about number and training of U.S. Marines during a coming international maritime warfare exercise. In response to this request Wei sent multiple photographs of military equipment to the intelligence officers. Also in August 2022 again Wei sent additional 26 technical and mechanical manuals related to the power structure and operation of the Essex and similar ships. The manuals contained warnings that this was technical data subject to export controls, and that it was deemed critical technology by the U.S. Navy.
(20:23)
So you see the […] is created, right? CCP initially test Wei’s capacity in accessing technical, sensitive information. And when they say yes, initially 30 manuals, then they want more. And more things is not only about the ship itself, not only about this type of ships, because a lot of things are the same in different ships, which will give CCP a very good chance to destroy multi[ple] ships, multi[ple] system[s] at the same time[] using same countermeasures in the future.
(21:05)
And also you see, coming […] China wants the realtime information during the military exercise. This is important because China has already showed ambition to fight against the U.S. And the Navy is very important because we will assume that if the war start — except for the unrestricted way like bioweapons, propaganda, financial war, like this — when we talk about real war, the hot war, you see China and Russia paired together, and Russia has a very strong navy.
(21:44)
China also has been developing its navy for the past several years. And also CCP modified the civil 10,000 tons of bigger that kind of ships to ship to carry the tanks and other vehicles, the army vehicles, the weapons. Right? So that means navy is a very critical part in the strategies against America in the future. Also remember they have very strong nuclear submarines and they always do the joint exercise […] from Japan Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan Straits, even to Bering Sea, right?
(22:30)
As reported by Wall Street Journal, last week, recently Russia and China have found that they have seen large naval vessel near Alaska and four U.S. destroyers were deployed to monitor Russian and Chinese ships. Based on the statement from the Alaska lawmakers that the […] ships include 11 ships and this is a stark reminder of Alaska’s proximity to both China and Russia as well as the essential role our state plays in our national defense and our territorial sovereignty.
Now let’s go back to the case.
(23:05)
The indictment further alleged that in October 2022 Wei sent a technical manual to the intelligence officer describing the layout and location of certain departments including berthing quarters and weapons systems. Specifically, Wei sent a weapons control system manual for the Essex and similar ships. This manual contained export-controlled data that could not be exported without a license from the U.S. government. And apparently, Wei knowingly violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations by transmitting the manual to the Chinese intelligence officer without obtaining a required license.
(23:50)
Also the IC officer continued to request information in 2023, including information about the overhaul and upgrades to the Essex. Specifically, he requested blueprints, especially those related to modifications to the flight deck. Wei provided information related to the repairs the Essex was undergoing as well as other mechanical problems with similar vessels.
(24:20)
See, here, they talk about mechanical problems, within the Essex and similar vessels. And they give the information related to repairs this time, it already reached to the weakness of the Essex and similar ships. This is what I said. For CCP to specifically make a destructive plan against American navy.
And during the alleged conspiracy IC officer instructed Wei to gather U.S. military information that was not public and admonished him not to discuss their relationship.
(25:04)
So that’s what we know. […]
(26:00)
This is very serious. We don’t need to have too much professional knowledge to understand the danger of the situation, and how much stress CCP has posed to U.S. military. And we definitely need to worry about how many else in this system, in the military, in the government, CCP has implanted to work for them.
[break]
(32:00)
[…]
(32:30)
According to National Security Council spokesman John Kirby, this case is an active, ongoing investigation under DOD’s jurisdiction. We know that everyone in the military takes seriously their obligations to protect sensitive information. And when that information is not protected, when it is deliberately shared with foreign powers, that this is something we will have to take seriously.
(33:00)
And I read a foreign report on Wei’s case. It exposes more details. One thing which is shocking is Wei, the 22-year-old navy sailor has told his mother about his working with CCP. He told his mother about these things during Christmas last year when he went back home to Wisconsin. However his mother encouraged him to help CCP to collect information. According to the prosecutor, mom told Wei this kind of intelligence work will help Wei to get a better job from CCP when he leaves American navy in the future.
(33:50)
Also CCP intelligence officer told Wei they wanted to meet Wei and his mom in mainland China. So that’s why in the spring of 2023 Wei had searched [for] a flight ticket back to mainland China. Initially when I read this detail, the first idea, is like all of you, how could a mom encourage the kid to do the spy work, especially when the kid just became an American citizen?
(34:25)
According to the report, this guy just obtained his citizenship in the past year. That’s why CCP IC officer even congratulated him, because that means we can get more opportunity to access more classified information in the future.
First let’s think about the image in this scenario. Wei came back home for Christmas. He talked about this spy work with his mom. One question, here, why would Wei talk about his spy work with mom?
We know the CCP officer has taught Wei to erase all the evidence and to keep secret on this spy work. So, definitely the officers should have already taught Wei not to discuss this to anyone else. This should be basic knowledge, right? Common sense.
But why would Wei talk to his mother?
(35:30)
Is that because Wei and his mother are so close, he’s willing to share anything, even the spy work which would related to his future, his life, to his mom? Ok, maybe? Maybe he has such a very intimate relationship with his mother.
(35:54)
But the mother, if she is an ordinary person, when she heard about that, when she knew her son is already the American citizen and also gather job in navy, and navy provide very good welfare in the future for young kid definitely it is quite a good job, right?
Why his mom immediately jump to the future possibilities? That Wei would go back to China and CCP would give a better job for Wei in China?
(36:33)
I’m Chinese. I just assume if I’m at a position like the mom, how could a mom know CCP will provide better job to Wei? And why could she believe that? For an ordinary person, shouldn’t the mother feel fear about the risk her son takes, and also the potential punishment if this spy work is discovered by U.S. government? Why didn’t she advise her son to not do the spy work?
And compared to the risk for her she encouraged the son to do this spy work, it means she believes the son will get potential benefits from CCP for sure, and somehow she knows that CCP could give her son the better jobs, the better treatment, after the spy work.
For me, I couldn’t understand the mother’s thinking, unless there is one possibility — that the mom also knows spy work. And maybe she has some kind of spy work involved the related activities.
(38:00)
To be honest, I don’t think this is a common response from an ordinary mother in such scenario. And also, I would wonder, her mom’s background in China. This is not far-fetched. I don’t want to attack the mom? I actually prefer to believe the mom was kind of stupid but innocent. However, let’s just discuss the possibilities based on CCP’s patterns. Their working styles and their tactics in overseeing Chinese people. I think about the possibilities.
The mom, when she hear the son stole and secretly delivered such sensitive information back to China, her response was unusual. And her response demonstrates her trust, her confidence [in] the CCP government. However, as a Chinese person, I can tell you that ordinary Chinese people would not have so much confidence [in] our regime.
(39:13)
Because in CCP’s history in the past hundred years, they never keep promise. So if you haven’t work in the government in the military in the system and you haven’t had enough experience and connections with CCP, then you cannot build this kind of confidence to this regime. In most cases, for example, like me, I have no this kind of any background in CCP government, my parents, my family members they are not government officials, not military officials. And I know I don’t have anything I can rely on if I work in China. And this is common sense. Majority of people will have this knowledge.
(40:00)
And that’s why when they receive such spy demand, right, they won’t, first think they will think about is, should I do it, and if I do it, will they treat me, and they use me and abandon me? This is a normal person’s thinking. So in this navy spy’s case, he is young and he [would] have left China when he was a teenager. He may lack this kind of knowledge. But his mom definitely should have such thinking. And so his mom — because they’re already American citizens, they stay in U.S., the son has already got a job which will have a good future.
The first thing, except for the […] the mom should think is, rather, this is worth it? And there is risk, of course. So how can she do to help the son reduce the risk when he works with CCP agents, right?
Most Chinese people, ordinary people, don’t want [to] get involved into too much politic[al] things.
(41:09)
And [what] Wei has done is very political, illegal, between two governments. Either on the CCP side or on the American side. And so since the kid has already chosen American citizenship, mom’s response should be advise him to get avoid of this kind of risky things. And keep these things from the officers. Because once something bad happens, the mom should know the kid will face even the life sentence.
However, the mom’s response is to encourage him, even to help the kid, to describe the beautiful future back to China with all his achievements from American navy to obtain a better job with good salary, with good welfare, in China. This sounds more like his mom is helping [the] CCP officer for certain reason. To convince the kid to serve [the] Chinese communist party.
(42:19)
Is that because she has already got some other information that indicate this kind of behavior will bring [her] kid very attractive treatment in the future? For example, as we know the United Front campaign in U.S., so this kind of campaign will use associations like Chinese-American alumni, Chinese-American business, Chinese-American […] association, organizations to recruit people and then brainwash them.
Also these agents in the United Front campaign will use the chance to establish personal connections with overseas Chinese people and their family. And then further identify the potential use for targets and then manage to […] convince these kinds of targets to serve the CCP.
(43:18)
In this case, maybe this mom — and it’s very probably the mom has a lot of friends in the local United Front campaign — so she can receive a lot of CCP propaganda, CCP’s patriotic education, as I told you, the nationalism, right? Tell people to love CCP, love the country because you are Chinese person. This ultimately the way of fascism.
So, she could be brainwashed very deeply, and she views that kind of extraordinary confidence to […] love the motherland. And that’s why when her son was recruited as a spy, she feel excited and also want her son to serve better for CCP.
(44:06)
Ok. This is one possibility. However, I think about the other detail we have from the report. CCP officers invite both Wei and his mom back to mainland China, supposed to be this year, to talk more about the spy work.
(44:28)
Well, some questions I have are, if the mom is just another innocent person who’s stupid, who is brainwashed by CCP, used to target her son to convince her son, encourage her son to work as a spy, why would the CCP IC officer pay the tickets, invite the mom and son together, go back to China?
(44:56)
Because when they go back to China this will be a very confidential meetings between the IC officer and Wei. And the mom’s involvement definitely would increase the risk to release the secret. So I wonder how much Wei’s mom involved in his spy work? Is she just greedy? Stupid? Or does she also work for CCP and even have some secret mission in the United States for CCP? We don’t know yet.
(45:33)
It requires investigation. Somehow we know in CCP’s history it is very common that in one family, the family member would [be] developed by the mom, father, or siblings, to work for CCP. And this is a way to established a miniature spy network among the family. And this works very well for CCP. They have developed very mature tactics to use these people in one family, and also this brings advantage for CCP’s spy work intelligence work, because within the family they could be more supportive, trustworthy and stable during operations.
(46:25)
Let’s turn to the other separate case […] about the Navy service member WENHENG ZHAO, who is accused of collecting bribes from a Chinese IC officer in exchange for sensitive military photos, radios[?] and plans.
(46:44)
The scheme allegedly began around August 2021 and continued until at least May of this year. Zhao has leaked information including operational plans for a U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region, which is very important for Russia and China.
(47:02)
And the prosecutors say Zhao also secretly recorded some of the information that he had over. According to the DOJ report, Petty Officer U.S. Navy service member Zhao Wenheng, 26 years old, was arrested following an indictment by a federal grand jury. Charging him with receiving bribes in exchange for transmitting sensitive U.S. military information to an individual posing as a maritime economic researcher but actually a CCP IC officer.
(47:44)
So here they have mentioned that the CCP’s IC officer had a fake identity, pretend to be a maritime economic researcher. This is very common because in China the military civil […] is very broad and this kind of IC officer [doesn’t] even need to falsify their identity. They can get a real civil identity from certain institute, pretend to be a researcher. And they could go to U.S. and other countries for further research using these kind of civil positions, without any doubt. And they definitely will cover up their history in PLA as much as possible.
(48:22)
Zhao worked at the naval base Port Hueneme in California and also with a U.S. security clearance. Beginning August 2021 and continue throughout at least May 2023, at a CCP official’s direction, he sends a Chinese military officer non-public and controlled operational plans for a large-scale U.S. military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region which detailed the specific location and timing of naval force movement, amphibious landings, maritime operations and logistics support.
(49:02)
[This is] all very important information because American army is doing a military exercise, and China needs to know the details to countermeasure it in the hot war when it happens.
And all these kind of logistic, landing, movement information provide the perfect details for the CCP and Russia to make their strategy.
(49:26)
So this CCP officer told Zhao that he was seeking information for investment decisions. And after the exchange of the information, Zhao received around $15,000. And besides the sensitive information we mentioned, he also photographed, electronic diagrams and blueprints for a radar system stationed on U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan.
Okinawa is very important for Americans’ island chain strategy. And Russia and China have been patterning[?] around Japan for many months repeatedly in looking for the right time to attack Japan and destroy Americans’ island chain.
(50:20)
So, in this case, Zhao also he just received $15,000, he has provided much more valuable information to CCP and the evil axis. And Zhao also concealed the relationship with this IC officer and destroyed evidence of the unlawful and corrupt scheme.
In the document, U.S. Attorney Martin Estrada for the Central District of California, said: “By sending this sensitive military information to an intelligence officer employed by a hostile foreign state, the defendant betrayed his sacred oath to protect our country and uphold the Constitution.”
(51:02)
Unlike the vast majority of navy personnel who serve the nation with honor distinction and courage, Mr. Zhao chose to corruptly sell out his colleagues and his country. If convicted, Zhao faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. And for certain reasons Zhao’s document is still kind of sealed, so we don’t have much more details about this case.
(51:32)
In another report, I read that it seems Zhao has married with another U.S. Navy member, and some of Zhao’s relatives also work in the U.S. military. We don’t know whether Zhao have take this kind of advantages to get information through his relatives and his family members. We hope he didn’t do that, because it would destroy the whole family and destroy all the people who love him, which is definitely a disaster.
(52:02)
When the two cases are published, China government’s response is to deny everything and doesn’t admit that these are Chinese spies — which is not surprise. Because, not like U.S., or even not like Russia-U.S.S.R., Chinese Communist Party usually won’t admit their spies [are] in other countries. That means being a spy for CCP unless you are very very important like for example inside some very influential [kills?] and take over the local government, then CCP won’t admit your identity. The spy will be abandoned […] will stay in the jail, committed suicide or even removed by CCP because this is the best way to keep secret for CCP.
(52:56)
And also CCP could continuously pretend to be friendly to other countries. Because, see, we don’t have spies working in your country, we are your friend all the times.
This is very typical CCP’s cunning style, which is very despicable.
And I also have seen some commentators in the media telling the Americans that, oh, those two spies are just low raking navy sailors, so they won’t make a lot of harm and CCP just gets some useless information from them, and you don’t need to be worried too much about these kind of spy cases.
(53:42)
I can tell you this kind of commentators clearly try to downplay the importance of the spy cases. It may not work for the military officers […] but it would interfere with the public opinions. And this kind of spy case has a possibility to get the grand jury […] so change the public opinions while potentially help CCP to continue such spy work in the United States.
(54:19)
Also, these two spies don’t have the high title. But one thing is because they are very young. One is 22, the other is 26. And they just naturalized to be American citizens, right? So that means CCP is cultivating young people and develop[ing] them, so later CCP could use their power to help them promote to the very import to the very important position in the navy and at that time they would be very important for CCP spy work.
(54:50)
And don’t forget, although these people are low ranking sailors, they have passed their security clearance. And in this case they could access to different classified information. If CCP had developed a group of such low-ranking officers in the navy, in military, in government, then finally this deal could collect enough information to make the countermeasure[…] plan focusing on Americans’ weakness and loopholes in your system.
(55:24)
And by the way, CCP has established their propaganda using anti-Chinese and anti-Asian racism to blame Americans whenever their bad behaviors were revealed. And in this case I just want to emphasize, as a Chinese whistleblower, I always advocate Chinese people that don’t help Chinese Communist Party and we should stand on the same side with the United States because U.S. is representative of the free world.
(55:59)
And Chinese Communist Party try to use all the means to kidnap Chinese people with them for the very evil purposes. They are anti-human. And there is no future for such a[n] evil regime. So we should bravely speak out to help Americans understand the CCP’s nature, their tactics, their strategy, understand their evilness, and fight together against Chinese Communist Party.
Thank you for listening to the Voice of Dr. Yan ….